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I. INTRODUCTION
In the ten years since its enactment, § 2301 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") 2 has become perhaps the single most
significant statute in the regulation of online content, and one of the most
heavily criticized. Many early commentators criticized both Congress,
for its apparent inability to craft the more limited statute it intended, and
the courts, for interpreting the statute broadly and failing to limit its
reach. Later commentators focus more clearly on policy concerns,
contending that the failure to impose liability on intermediaries fails to
effectuate principles of efficiency and cost avoidance.
This Article takes the opposing view, in defense of broad § 230
immunity. It argues that the immunity provisions of § 230 play a
significant role in broader questions of Internet governance.
Specifically, § 230 immunity provides a means of working within the
sovereign legal system to effectuate many of the goals, ideals, and
realities of the Internet exceptionalism, cyberlibertarian movements. By
mitigating the imposition of certain external legal norms in the online
environment, § 230 helps to create the initial conditions necessary for the
development of a modified form of exceptionalism. With the impact of
external norms diminished, Web 2.0 communities, such as wikis and
social networks, have emerged to facilitate a limited market in norms and
values and to provide internal enforcement mechanisms that allow new
communal norms to emerge. Section 230 plays a vital role in this
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Penn State University's Dickinson School of Law. I
would like to express my appreciation to Professor Eric Goldman for his comments on an earlier
draft of this article, and to reference librarian Jennifer Grieg and law student Laura Gebert for their
research assistance. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to law student Kevin Wimberly, who served
as my research assistant and editor for nearly three years. Finally, my appreciation to Sarah, Will
and Ella for the most important things.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43.
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process of building heterogeneous communities that encourage
collaborative production and communication. Efforts to substantially
reform or restrict § 230 immunity are therefore unnecessary and unwise.
Part II of this Article provides a brief introduction to § 230. As
interpreted and applied by the judiciary, this statute is now conceived as
a broad grant of immunity from tort liability, not only in terms of those
who can claim its protection, but also in the breadth of predicate acts and
causes of action to which such immunity extends. Part III of this Article
attempts to position the expansion of § 230 immunity within the larger
debate over Internet governance, suggesting that proponents of expanded
immunity are successfully creating what might be characterized as a
modified, less demanding form of cyberlibertarian exceptionalism. The
dramatic expansion of § 230 immunity has in a limited sense effectuated
a vision of a community in which norms of relationship, thought and
expression are yet to be formed. The tort liability from which § 230
provides immunity is, together with contract, a primary means by which
society defines civil wrongs actionable at law. In the near absence of
these external norms of conduct regulating relationships among
individuals, the online community is free to create its own norms, its own
rules of conduct, or none at all. It is a glimpse of an emergent
community existing within, rather than without, the sovereign legal
system.
Part IV of this Article makes the case for preserving broad § 230
immunity. As an initial matter, many of the reforms offered by
commentators are both unnecessary and unwise because the costs of
imposing indirect liability on intermediaries are unreasonable in
relationship to the harm deterred or remedied by doing so. Moreover, the
imposition of liability would undermine the development of Web 2.0
communities as a form of modified exceptionalism that encourages the
development of communal norms, efficient centers of collaborative
production, and open forums for communication.
II. THE EXPANSION OF § 230 IMMUNITY
In May of 1995, a New York trial court rocked the emerging online
industry with its decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co.3 The plaintiff in Stratton sought to hold the Prodigy computer
network liable for libelous comments posted on one of its bulletin boards
3. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute,
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133, as recognized in Dimeo
v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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by a third-party.4 In its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
argued that Prodigy was a "publisher" of the libelous comments, as
opposed to a mere "distributor." 5 This was a key distinction, because
under New York law-and the law of most states-publishers are held
strictly liable for defamatory comments whereas distributors may be held
liable only if they knew or had reason to know of the allegedly libelous
nature of the material.6
In defense, Prodigy relied on Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., a
factually similar case in which the Southern District of New York ruled
that the CompuServe computer network was to be treated as a
distributor.7  In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
CompuServe had "no opportunity to review" the libelous material before
it was uploaded to the bulletin board and made immediately available to
subscribers.8 As such, "CompuServe ha[d] no more editorial control
over such a publication than does a public library, book store...
newsstand... [or] any other distributor."9 As a distributor, CompuServe
could only be liable if it "knew or had reason to know" that the
comments were libelous. 10  Plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the
knowledge requirement, and summary judgment was granted in favor of
CompuServe. 11
Despite the apparent similarities between the CompuServe and
Prodigy bulletin board services, the New York state court rejected
Prodigy's reliance on the CompuServe decision.12  Distinguishing the
cases factually, the Prodigy court agreed with the CompuServe court that
the critical issue was whether Prodigy "exercised sufficient editorial
control over its computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the
same responsibilities as a newspaper."' 13  In finding that Prodigy had,
4. Id. at *I.
5. Id. at *2.
6. Id. at *3.
7. 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
8. Id. at 137.
9. Id. at 140. The court also states "it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine
every publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it would be for any other
distributor to do so." Id.
10. Id. at 140-41.
11. Id. at 141 ("Because CompuServe, as a news distributor, may not be held liable if it neither
knew nor had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements, summary
judgment in favor of CompuServe on the libel claim is granted.").
12. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 133, as recognized in Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
13. Id. at *3.
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unlike CompuServe, exercised sufficient editorial control, the court
emphasized two key distinctions between the services, each related to
Prodigy's positioning as a "family oriented computer network., 14 First,
unlike CompuServe, Prodigy "held itself out to the public and its
members as controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards. ' ' 5
Second, Prodigy exercised "editorial control" over its computer bulletin
boards by "actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes
from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and 'bad
taste."",16  Through these actions, Prodigy distinguished itself from
CompuServe by "arrogat[ing] to itself the role of determining what is
proper for its members to post and read on its bulletin boards."17 As a
result, Prodigy was treated as a publisher of the information and held
strictly liable for the libelous comments of its third-party subscriber.18
Representatives of the online industry argued that the Prodigy
decision placed service providers in an untenable position by "creat[ing]
a 'Hobson's choice' between creating 'child safe' areas that expose the
ISP to liability as an editor, monitor, or publisher, and doing nothing in
order to protect the ISP from liability." 19 Congress responded to the
decision by amending the CDA to include a tailored immunity provision
addressing the online industry's concerns. As one element of what came
to be known as the "Good Samaritan" provisions of the CDA,2° § 230
was generally intended to provide online service providers and bulletin
board hosts with immunity from tort liability for the defamatory acts of
their users.2' This was accomplished by addressing those specific
elements of common law defamation at issue in the CompuServe and
14. Id. at *2.
15. Id. at *4.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act:
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 62 (1996).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000). See S. REt'. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) ("[T]his
section provides 'Good Samaritan' protection from civil liability.").
21. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (providing that online service providers shall not be "treated as
the publisher or speaker"). As described on Rep. Cox's website:
Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act. Approved August 4, 1995, by 420-4
vote. Portions signed into law on February 8, 1996, as part of Telecommunications Act:
Public Law 104-104. Ensures that on-line service providers who take steps to clean up
the Interet are no longer subject to additional liability for being 'good samaritans.' Bars
the Federal Communications Commission from content or economic regulation of the
Intemet.
Legislative Accomplishments: 104th Congress Legislative Accomplishments, at http://web.archive.
org/web/20021128230716/cox.house.gov/html/accomplishments.cfm?id=74 (last visited Jan. 9,
2008).
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Prodigy decisions--editorial control and the distinct treatment of
publishers and distributors under the law. To that end, subsection (1)
provided: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider., 22 Subsection (2) provided:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).23
In the ten years following the enactment of § 230, courts consistently
extended its application. This trend began in 1997 with the watershed
decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,24 in which the Fourth Circuit
applied § 230 to claims that America Online ("AOL") should be held
liable for the defamatory content posted by one of its users.25  The
plaintiffs claimed liability arose in part because AOL had allegedly failed
to remove third-party defamatory messages from its bulletin board
22. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
23. Id. § 230(c)(2).
24. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
25. For reasons unknown, an anonymous AOL subscriber identified only as "KenZZ03" posted
a message to one of AOL's bulletin boards titled "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts." Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 958 F.Supp. 1124, 1127 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). The
message advertised the sale of various "t-shirts with vulgar and offensive slogans related to the
Oklahoma City [bombing] tragedy." Id. "Readers were invited to call 'Ken,' Zeran's first name, at
Zeran's [actual] phone number." Id. At the time, Zeran had no knowledge of the posting and at no
time was he involved in the sale of these t-shirts. Id. Not surprisingly, "Zeran was inundated with
calls, most of which were derogatory and some of which included death threats and intimidation."
Id. Zeran was "[u]nable to suspend or change his telephone number due to business necessity," so
the offensive and threatening phone calls continued unabated. Id. The next day a second notice
appeared under a slightly modified alias. Id. This notice announced that many shirts had "SOLD
OUT," but that "several new slogans were now available." Id. Zeran's first name and telephone
number were listed at the bottom of the message. Id. Making matters worse, an Oklahoma City
radio station read one of the posts over the air and encouraged listeners to call "'Ken' at Zeran's
telephone number to register their disgust and disapproval." Id. at 1128. Not surprisingly, this was
followed by "another cascade of threatening, intimidating, any [sic] angry telephone calls." Id. This
went on for weeks before finally tapering off. Id.
2008]
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reasoable 26system within a reasonable time, refused to post retractions to
defamatory messages,27 and failed to screen for similar defamatory
messages thereafter. z8 The court found the plaintiffs tort claims were
preempted by § 230, which rendered AOL immune.29 In reaching this
result, the court rejected a strict reading of § 230 as being limited to its
terms. Specifically, although the statute failed to make any explicit
reference to distributor liability, which the CompuServe and Prodigy
decisions appeared to leave intact, the court read distributor immunity
into the statute, finding that "distributor liability... is merely a subset,
or a species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by §
230."30  By collapsing the publisher-distributor distinction, the Fourth
Circuit adopted the most expansive reading possible of both defamation
law and § 230. Thus, even though AOL knew the statements were false,
defamatory, and causing great injury, AOL could simply refuse to take
proper remedial and preventative action without fear of liability.
Following Zeran, and building on that court's reading of both the
statute and the policies sought to be effected, courts have consistently
extended the reach of § 230 immunity along three lines: (1) by expanding
the class who may claim its protections; (2) by limiting the class
statutorily excluded from its protections; and (3) by expanding the causes
of action from which immunity is provided. As to the first, courts have
interpreted the provision of immunity to "interactive computer services"
to include web hosting services, 31 email service providers, 32 commercial
web sites like eBay33 and Amazon,34 individual35 and company 36
26. Zeran learned of the initial posting from a reporter investigating the story and immediately
contacted AOL "to demand prompt removal of the notice and a retraction." Id. at 1127. "An AOL
representative assured him that the offending notice would be removed." Id.
27. AOL refused to post a retraction on its network as "a matter of policy." Id.
28. After the second posting, Zeran demanded that "AOL delete the notice and take steps to
block further bogus messages using his name and phone number." Id. AOL advised him that the
notice would be deleted and that the account posting the notices would be terminated. Id. at 1127-
28. Despite these assurances, similar notices continued to appear on AOL's bulletin board over the
next week, with similar consequences. Id. at 1128.
29. Id. at 1136. See also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334.
30. Id. at 332.
31. Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 WL 816779, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000),
affdsub nom. Does v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). See also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall &
Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (raised as a defense by web-hosting service, but
held not dispositive).
32. Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000), aff'd, 792 A.2d
911 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
33. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 712-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Stoner v. eBay
Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000).
34. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
35. Sabbato v. Hardy, No. 2000CAOO 136, 2000 WL 33594542, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 18,
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websites, Internet dating services,37 privately-created chat rooms,38 and
Internet access points in copy centers 39 and libraries.40  The additional
provision of immunity to "users" of those services promises similar
results. Already, one decision has held that a newsgroup "user" cannot
be held liable for re-posting libelous comments by a third party,4 1 while
another court found a website message board to be both a provider and a
user of an interactive computer service.42
The second line of extension results from a narrow reading of the
term "information content provider," which defines the class for whom
there is no immunity. Specifically, courts have held that those who make
"minor alterations" or "take some affirmative steps to edit the material"
provided by another do not become information content providers within
the meaning of the statute so long as they retain the material's "basic
form and message. 43 The third point of expansion has been to extend §
230 immunity beyond causes of action for defamation and related claims
to provide immunity from claims of negligent assistance in the
sale/distribution of child pornography,44 negligent distribution of
pornography of and to adults,45 negligent posting of incorrect stock
information,46 sale of fraudulently autographed sports memorabilia,47
invasion of privacy, 48 and misappropriation of the right of publicity.
49
2000). But see Batzel v. Smith, No. CV 00-9590 SWW(AJWX), 2001 WL 1893843, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. June 5, 2001) (holding that an individual website operator did not fall within the immunity
provision of § 230 because the only "qualifying entities" under that provision are "true internet
service providers, like America Online, that provide[] individuals with access to the internet").
36. Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 1999 WL 33494857, at *4
(W.D. Mich. June 29, 1999) (Section 230 raised as a defense, but held not dispositive).
37. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065-66 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aft'd,
339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
38. Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (D. Conn. 2000).
39. PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001).
40. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
41. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 527 (Cal. 2006). Interestingly, this case was originally
misreported in practice journals as applying § 230 immunity to the host or operator of a chat room.
However, the facts of the case indicate that the defendant was merely a user of the system. Id. at 527
(indicating that "Rosenthal used the Internet to gain access to newsgroups where she posted [an]
article" by a third-party).
42. DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
43. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Donato v. Moldow, 865
A.2d 711, 724 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quoting Batzel v. Smith).
44. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001).
45. Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 WL 816779, at *5 (N.D. I11. June 22, 2000),
affd sub nom. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
46. Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
47. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
48. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
49. See id at 1122, 1125 (extending § 230 immunity to defendant in claim "alleging invasion
of privacy, misapproriation of the right of publicity, defamation and negligence"). See also Perfect
2008]
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III. SECTION 230, INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND EXCEPTIONALISM
Situated within the larger debate over Internet governance, the
concept of Internet exceptionalism presumes that cyberspace cannot be
confined by physical borders or controlled by traditional sovereign
governments, and thus that cyberlibertarian communities will emerge in
which norms of relationship, thought and expression are yet to be
formed. Although these ideas have been subjected to intense criticism
and somewhat obscured by recent developments in the governance
debates, they remain a touchstone for the cyberlibertarian ideal. This
part of the Article seeks to clear space in the governance debates for this
vision of exceptionalism, and argues that § 230 is in some limited way
facilitating the emergence of cyberlibertarian communities in a modified,
less demanding form.
A. Foundational Arguments of Internet Governance
The debate over Internet governance evolved in two surprisingly
distinct, albeit convergent stages. The first stage of the governance
debate focused on law and social norms, and whether these traditional
models of regulating human relations could be validly applied to the
online environment.50 In this context, exceptionalism was conceptualized
as a state of being to which the Internet had naturally evolved, apart from
terrestrial space. 5  The second stage of the debate introduced network
architecture as an important and potentially dominant means of
regulating the online environment.52  In this context, exceptionalism
10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that § 230 immunity
extends to state-law intellectual property claims, including unfair competition, false advertising, and
right of publicity).
50. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy," 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
1199 (1998) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy]; Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and
the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475 (1998)
[hereinafter Goldsmith, The Internet].
51. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 2 (Feb. 8,
1996), http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007) (declaring
"the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to
impose on us").
52. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 217 (1999). See
generally David G. Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1439 (2000). Interestingly, Lessig decided to use the wiki format to update his book as
Code 2.0:
After five years in print and five years of changes in law, technology, and the context in
which they reside, Code needs an update. But rather than do this alone, Professor Lessig
[Vol. 56
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became an objective to be pursued and protected as a matter of choice,
rather than a natural state. At a more exacting level, these debates
implicated fundamental questions of legitimacy, preference, politics,
democracy, collective decision-making, and libertarian ideals.
In the early 1990s, as the Internet began to reach the masses with the
advent of the World Wide Web,53 a particular vision of the online
environment emerged to advocate and defend Internet exceptionalism.
Described by one scholar as "digital libertarianism,, 54 and another as
"cyberlibertarian[ism], '' 55 the vision was one of freedom, liberty, and
self-regulation. 56  Cyberlibertarians believed the Internet could and
would develop its own effective legal institutions through which rules
would emerge. 57  These emerging norms would "play the role of law by
defining legal personhood and property, resolving disputes, and
crystallizing a collective conversation about online participants' core
values. 58  As this account suggests, early cyberlibertarians tended to
focus on norms of behavior, relationship, and content, rather than the
control and regulation of network architecture. Control of architecture
was seen almost exclusively as an instrument by which to enforce
emerging social norms,59 and not as a means of determining the norms
is using this wiki to open the editing process to all, to draw upon the creativity and
knowledge of the community. This is an online, collaborative book update; a first of its
kind.
Once the project nears completion, Professor Lessig will take the contents of this wiki
and ready it for publication. The resulting book, Code v.2, will be published in late 2005
by Basic Books. All royalties, including the book advance, will be donated to Creative
Commons.
WIKIHOME: WHAT'S GOING ON HERE?, http://codebook.jot.com/WikiHome (last visited Sept. 14,
2007).
53. See David T. Cox, Litigating Child Pornography and Obscenity Cases in the Internet Age,
4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 5-6 (1999) ("[B]y 1994, the Intemet was no longer a playground for only
the academic and defense communities."). Cox further states "[p]re-Web Internet use required a
certain computer savvy that few outside academia possessed. As the easy-to-use Web interface to
the Internet grew, so did the Internet's popularity among the masses." Id. at 6.
54. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors,
66 U. CIN. L. REv. 177, 177-79 (1997) (describing the "Internet Holy Trinity" of "digital
libertarianism").
55. Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering. Rediscovering
Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1998) (describing
"cyberlibertarians" and "anarcho-cyberlibertarians").
56. See Boyle, supra note 54, at 177-79.
57. See Johnson & Post, supra note 50, at 1387.
58. Id. at 1367.
59. See id. at 1388-89. Johnson and Post describe the connection between norms and
enforcement in early cyberspace as follows:
Every system operator who dispenses a password imposes at least some requirements as
conditions of continuing access, including paying bills on time or remaining a member of
a group entitled to access (for example, students at a university). System operators
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
themselves. By the mid-1990s this process of self-regulation was well
underway. As two leading cyberlibertarians observed in 1996,
"[c]yberspace is anything but anarchic; its distinct rule sets are becoming
more robust every day.
At the same time, however, sovereign nations and their constituents
increasingly sought to impose existing offline legal regimes on this
emerging, resource-rich environment. 61 Many in the online community
resisted, perceiving this regulation as a threat to the exceptional nature of
the Internet.62  Advocates of self-regulation envisioned cyberspace as a
distinct sphere, apart from physical space.63 These cyberlibertarian
exceptionalists saw the imposition of existing offline legal systems
grounded in territorially-based sovereignty as inappropriate.64  They
believed that the online environment should instead be permitted to
develop its own discrete system of legal rules and regulatory processes.65
(sysops) have an extremely powerful enforcement tool at their disposal to enforce such
rules-banishment. Moreover, communities of users have marshaled plenty of
enforcement weapons to induce wrongdoers to comply with local conventions, such as
rules against flaming, shunning, mailbombs, and more. And both sysops and users have
begun to recognize explicitly that formulating and enforcing such rules should be a
matter for principled discussion, not an act of will by whoever has control of the power
switch.
While many of these new rules and customs apply only to specific, local areas of the
global network, some standards apply through technical protocols on a nearly universal
basis. And widespread agreement already exists about core principles of "netiquette" in
mailing lists and discussion groups-although, admittedly, new users have a slow
learning curve and the Net offers little formal "public education" regarding applicable
norms. Moreover, dispute resolution mechanisms suited to this new environment also
seem certain to prosper.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. Id. at 1389. See also Barlow, supra note 51, at 7 (asserting the rise of self-governance
among the inhabitants of cyberspace, stating, "[w]here there are real conflicts, where there are
wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social
Contract [sic].").
61. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311,315-16
(2002) (describing the movement of nation-states "to regulate almost every conceivable online
activity").
62. Johnson & Post, supra note 50, at 1378-87; Post, supra note 50, at 1367-71; Barlow, supra
note 51, at 1-6.
63. See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 50, at 1400-01. Johnson and Post conclude:
Global electronic communications have created new spaces in which distinct rule sets
will evolve. We can reconcile the new law created in this space with current territorially
based legal systems by treating it as a distinct doctrine, applicable to a clearly demarcated
sphere, created primarily by legitimate, self-regulatory processes, and entitled to
appropriate deference-but also subject to limitations when it oversteps its appropriate
sphere.
Id.
64. See id. at 1370-76 (claiming that the Internet, by its nature, destroys the link between
territorial borders, sovereign nations, and legitimate control).
65. See id. at 1400-02 (discussing our ability to reconcile cyberlaw with legal systems created
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As John Perry Barlow famously declared: "Governments of the
Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from
Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of
the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no
sovereignty where we gather." 66  Self-regulation was preferable in its
own right because it had proven so effective in creating the environment
sought to be preserved, and also because the alternative seemed
devastating. The imposition of external, territorially-based legal regimes
would be, the exceptionalists argued, infeasible, ineffective, and
fundamentally damaging to the online environment. 7
Faced with the attempted imposition of offline legal regimes,
cyberlibertarians responded by attacking the validity of exercising
sovereign authority and external control over cyberspace. 68 According to
Professors Johnson and Post, two leading proponents of self-governance,
external regulation of the online environment would be invalid because
Internet exceptionalism-the state of being to which the Internet
naturally evolved--destroys the link between territorially-based
sovereigns and their validating principles of power, legitimacy, effect,
and notice.69 Most importantly, the Internet's decentralized architecture
deprives territorially-based sovereigns of the power, or ability, to
by legitimate, self-regulatory processes entitled to deference but "subject to limitations when it
oversteps its appropriate sphere").
66. Barlow, supra note 51, at 1.
67. See id at 2 (declaring to the established sovereign powers that they "have no moral right
to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear").
68. See Johnson & Post, supra note 50, at 1375-76 (arguing that "the effects of online activities
[are not] tied to geographically proximate locations"). See also Barlow, supra note 51, at 3
(asserting to established sovereign powers that "Cyberspace does not lie within your borders").
69. Johnson & Post, supra note 50, at 1370-76. Johnson and Post acknowledge the importance
of territorial borders to the existing system of determining legal rights and responsibilities, and
accept that this correlation makes sense in the off-line world. Id. at 1369-70. Such validity,
according to Johnson and Post, is based on the logical relationship between territorial borders and
four related considerations: power, legitimacy, effects, and notice. Id. The power to control a
particular area of physical space, and the people and things located therein, "is a defining attribute of
sovereignty and statehood." Id. at 1369. This power rests on the singular ability of the sovereign to
enforce the law within its borders. Id. The legitimacy of sovereign power is, in turn, premised on
the "consent of the govemed"-the idea that "persons within a geographically defined border are the
ultimate source of law-making authority for activities within that border." Id. at 1369-70. The
exclusivity of sovereign power, to the exclusion of external forces, is rooted in the "relationship
between physical proximity and the effects of any particular behavior[,]" at least where there is no
substantial overlap. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added). Finally, as a practical matter, territorial borders
serve as signposts giving notice that a new regulatory regime now applies. Id. at 1370. The Internet,
Johnson and Post claim, by its nature destroys the link between territorial borders and these
validating principles. See id. at 1370-76. ("[P]hysical borders no longer function as signposts
informing individuals of the obligations assumed by entering into a new, legally significant place,"
because "[i]ndividuals are unaware of... those borders as they move through virtual space.").
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regulate online activity. 70  Likewise, extraterritorial application of
sovereign law fails to represent the consent of the governed,7' or to
effectuate exclusivity of authority based on a relative comparison of local
effects.72 The loss of these limiting principles results in overlapping and
inconsistent regulation of the same activity with significant spillover
effect.73 Deprived of these validating principles, it would be illegitimate
to apply sovereign authority and external control in cyberspace.
A primary challenge to these cyberlibertarian arguments came from
Professor Goldsmith,74 who engaged both their descriptive and normative
aspects. In terms of the legitimacy of sovereign regulation, Goldsmith
criticized Johnson and Post's limited view of sovereignty and over-
reliance on the relationship between physical proximity and territorial
effects.75 Moreover, he argued that they had overstated the impossibility
of regulation, mistaking ability for cost; 76 failed to recognize the
deterrent effect on extraterritorial actors of local enforcement against end
users and network components located within the territory; 77 and
mistakenly equated valid regulation with some measure of near-perfect
enforcement. 78 Finally, where true conflicts between sovereigns existed,
Goldsmith argued that these could be resolved with the same tools used
in the offline world-rules of jurisdiction, conflict of laws, enforcement,
etc. 79 Throughout, Goldsmith struck at Johnson and Post's exceptionalist
view of the Internet, implicitly rejecting the ultimate significance of both
the technical and communal aspects of that ideal. This critique proved
devastating to these early cyberlibertarian arguments.
80
The governance debate entered its second phase in 1999 with the
publication of Professor Lessig's book, Code and Other Laws of
70. Id. at 1370-73.
71. See also Barlow, supra note 51, at 3 (asserting that "[glovemments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed. . . [and] [y]ou have neither solicited nor received ours").
72. See Johnson & Post, supra note 50, at 1375.
73. Seeid. at 1374.
74. See generally Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 50; Goldsmith, The Internet,
supra note 50.
75. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 50, at 1239-40; Goldsmith, The Internet,
supra note 50, at 476-77.
76. Goldsmith, The Internet, supra note 50, at 478-79.
77. Id. at 481-82,
78. Id. at 478-83.
79. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 50, at 1232-37.
80. See H. Brian Holland, The Failure of the Rule of Law in Cyberspace?: Reorienting the
Normative Debate on Borders and Territorial Sovereignty, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 1, 4-13 (2005) (describing the debates "on the governance of cyberspace, borders, and territorial
sovereignty" between Professors Johnson, Post and Goldsmith, and weaknesses in the approach
taken by Johnson and Post).
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81Cyberspace. Prior to Lessig's book, the governance debate had
focused primarily on behavioral and property norms, with the assumption
that either existing sovereign law or the law emerging from Internet self-
governance would prevail. Network architecture merely provided the
means to enforce these norms,8 2 particularly those emerging from self-
governance.83 Lessig reconceived Internet exceptionalism as a two-part
phenomenon, one regulatory and the other cultural. The former
recognizes that many of those features that make the Internet
"exceptional" (in the cyberlibertarian sense) are merely coding choices,
and not the innate nature of cyberspace. 84  Within the network,
architecture and code are the most basic forms of regulation. 85 Code can
be easily changed8 6 Thus, Lessig argued, to protect the cultural aspects
of exceptionalism, we must first recognize the exceptional regulatory
power of architecture and code within cyberspace, and its pivotal role in
preserving or destroying that culture.
87
Lessig first pointed out that law and social norms are but two means
of regulating human behavior.88  In cyberspace, unlike real space, it is
possible for architecture to dominate regulatory structures. 89
Architecture acts as a regulator in the offline world as well-in the form
of time, nature, physics, etc.-but our laws and social norms are
generally conceived with these regulators assumed.90 Alteration of that
architecture is unusually difficult if not practically impossible. In
cyberspace, by comparison, architecture in the form of code is
remarkably fluid.9 1 Code effectuates a series of choices, and code can be
changed:
Cyberspace... has different architectures .... An extraordinary
amount of control can be built into the environment .... What data
can be collected, what anonymity is possible, what access is granted,
81. See LESSIG, supra note 52.
82. See Barlow, supra note 51, at 10 (arguing that, for inhabitants of cyberspace, "[olur
identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical coercion").
83. See id. ("[F]rom ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will
emerge.").
84. See LESSIG, supra note 52, at 24, 27.
85. Id. at 27.
86. See id. (arguing that the difference between regulable and unregulable networks is "a matter
of code" that "could be transformed").
87. Id. at 30.
88. See id. at 6 (stating that laws regulate real space and code regulates cyberspace).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 58-60.
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what speech will be heard-all these are choices, not "facts." All these
are designed, not found.
92
As this passage suggests, not only is code fluid, but within cyberspace it
is a uniquely powerful form of regulation. Rather than regulating
behavior and relationships through punishment, deterrence and post-
violation corrective action, code provides the means to exercise perfect
control and thus perfect regulation-regulation not just of effects, but of
the very universe of choices from which an individual actor is able to
select.9 3
With this shift in focus, the debate itself evolved. Lessig cautioned
that the greatest threat to the exceptional culture of cyberspace comes
from the union of perfect control and market forces of commerce.9 4 The
architectual components that provide the means of perfect control are
held almost exclusively by private entitites with commercial and political
interests distinct from the collective.95 The "invisible hand," Lessig
argued, cannot resist the promise of perfect control, and has little or no
motivation to protect the fundamental values promoted by
cyberlibertarian exceptionalism. 96  According to the cyberlibertarian
narrative, barriers that are present in the real world do not exist or are de
minimus in the online environment. In the context of Internet
architecture, exceptionalism can be found in original principles of
network design97 that rely on open protocols and non-discriminatory data
92. Id. at 217.
93. See id. at 90-95 (arguing that code can be used indirectly by different "regulators" to
constrain individual behaviors).
94. See id. at 30-60 (stating that "the changes that make commerce possible are also changes
that will make regulation easy").
95. Id. at 217.
96. See id. at 6 ("The invisible hand, through commerce, is constructing an architecture that
perfects control-an architecture that makes possible highly efficient regulation.").
97. See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1789 (2002).
Lessig describes it this way:
At the core of the Internet's design is an ideal called "end-to-end" (e2e) ... [which
contemplates networks designed] so that intelligence rests in the ends, and the network
itself remains simple. Simple networks, smart applications.
The reason for this design was simple .... New content or new applications could
run regardless of whether the network knew about them. New content or new applications
would run because the network simply took packets of data and moved them along. The
fundamental feature of this network design was neutrality among packets. The network
was simple, or "stupid," in David Isenberg's sense, and the consequence of stupidity, at
least among computers, is the inability to discriminate .... [T]his network was
architected never to allow anyone to decide what would be allowed.
Id. (citations omitted).
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transfer98-a network that is decentralized, borderless, and with the
potential for nearly unlimited data capacity. Indeed, the digital data
flowing through this system is itself exceptional, because it is easy to
create and manipulate, easy to copy with no degradation in quality, and
easy to access and distribute. In the context of online relationships,
exceptionalism resides (at the very least) in the interactivity, 99
immediacy, 100 and potential scope of interaction,10 1 as well as the
opportunity for anonymity.'0 2  However, the very promise of perfect
control is to eliminate many of these choices and the fundamental values
they reflect as subservient to commercial goals. In cyberspace, control
over coded architecture supplies the means for making this election.1
0 3
Building on this assertion, Lessig argued that in order to protect
fundamental values, decisions regarding architecture should emerge from
the body politic and collective decision-making, rather than being
concentrated in private actors.' 
04
For many cyberlibertarians, Lessig's message presented great
problems. 10 5 Although many had already abandoned the argument that
the exercise of sovereign authority in cyberspace was normatively
invalid, they had not given up (as a matter of preference) the vision of an
emergent, self-governed, digital libertarian space. 10 6  Sovereign legal
98. Id.
99. See Stephen R. Bergerson, E-Commerce Privacy and the Black Hole of Cyberspace, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2001) (noting "[t]he intimate nature, immediacy, interactivity
and popularity of online transactions").
100. See id. See also Jason Kay, Sexuality, Live Without a Net: Regulating Obscenity and
Indecency on the Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 355, 385 (1995) (noting that "[t]he
Internet is unique as a communications entity due to both the size of its audience and the immediacy
of communication between people.").
101. The "scope" of the Internet, as I use it here, refers simply to the vast, borderless nature of
the network and its impact on online interactions. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853
(1997) ("'Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from
entering any community."' (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996))).
102. See A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 4, 7,
available at http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/95_96/froomkin.html (observing that
"[b]asically, anything you can do with words and pictures, you can do anonymously on the
Internet"). See also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 574-75 (1998) (describing areas of technology
where anonymity exists); Mathias Strasser, Beyond Napster: How the Law Might Respond to a
Changing Internet Architecture, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 660, 707-08 (2001) (describing peer-to-peer
architecture, Freenet, and anonymous nodes).
103. See LESSIG, supra note 52, at 217 (stating that "[a]n extraordinary amount of control can be
built into the environment" of cyberspace).
104. See id. at 222, 225-30 (discussing the need for greater and better democracy as a response
to a changing cyberspace).
105. See Post, supra note 52, at 1439 (stating that "[a]s a normative call to arms, however,
[Lessig's] book is somewhat less successful").
106. See id. at 1440 (stating that the market, and not government, will bring the greatest
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
regimes were still seen as the greatest threat to that vision.10 7 Territorial
governments should, the cyberlibertarians argued, simply leave
cyberspace alone to flourish.108  From this perspective, Lessig's
arguments about the unique regulatory power of architecture and code in
cyberspace were largely convincing. But his description of the
corrupting influence of perfect control and concentrated private power,
and particularly his call for government regulation to counteract those
influences and preserve fundamental values, were difficult to square with
most libertarian views. Professor Post articulated this position:
Fundamental values are indeed at stake in the construction of
cyberspace, but those values can best be protected by allowing the
widest possible scope for uncoordinated and uncoerced individual
choice among different values and among different embodiments of
those values. We don't need "a plan" but a multitude of plans from
among which individuals can choose, and "the market," and not action
by the global collective, is most likely to bring that plenitude to us.
109
The current debate on net neutrality provides a glimpse of this
division. The network layers model divides the Internet into at least four
layers: content, applications, logical/code, and physical/infrastructure. 110
Many commentators, including Lessig, are concerned that the private
owners that control the physical/infrastructure layer will, in pursuit of
cross-layer vertical integration and increased revenues, "use their control
of the 'last mile' of the network to block or slow access to content and
applications that threaten their proprietary operations,""11 or to place "toll
booths at every on-ramp and exit on the information superhighway."
'1 12
These fears have been crystallized by recent court rulings and FCC rule
making that released broadband suppliers from prohibitions on
discrimination between content and application providers, and the
announcement by some of the broadband companies that such
protection).
107. See id. at 1458 (stating the author's skepticism of more political control over the regulation
of cyberspace).
108. See id. at 1459 ("[Clyberspace needs architectures where deliberation and reason and
freedom can flourish.").
109. Id. at 1440.
110. Adam Thierer, Are "'Dumb Pipe" Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net
Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275, 279 (2005).
111. Christopher S. Yon, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2005)
(summarizing Lessig's position).
112. Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST, June 8,
2006, at A23, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/07/
AR2006060702108_pf.html.
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discrimination is imminent.' 13 With Congress debating an overhaul of
the Telecommunications Act, advocates of net neutrality are seeking its
imposition by regulatory mandates 114 requiring, in general terms, that the
infrastructure remain simple, "dumb pipes"' 15 that treat all Internet
content alike to be moved across the network at the same speed. This
would in turn encourage broadband providers to remain confined to the
physical/infrastructure layer and out of the content business, with less
incentive to discriminate. According to Lessig, these governmentally-
imposed regulatory mandates are necessary to protect "the simple but
brilliant 'end-to-end' design of the Internet that has made it such a
powerful force for economic and social good: All of the intelligence and
control is held by producers and users, not the networks that connect
them."1 16
The irony of this debate is readily apparent. Many who might
otherwise have characterized themselves as cyberlibertarian, or at least
sympathetic to the vision of the Internet as a unique and "powerful force
for economic and social good"' 1 7 in which existing norms might not
apply and fundamental values could be reconceived as emerging from
the community rather than established political institutions, are suddenly
contradicting themselves. The norms and values of the online
community, rather than emerging from the common, are both imposed by
external sovereign legal systems and subordinated to the control of
commercial entities. In the extremes, it seems to present a choice
between entrenched political power and unregulated market forces, with
neither providing adequate protection for individuals. Thus, many of the
Internet exceptionalists who sought to segregate the Internet from
territorial boundaries, who assumed existing sovereign governments and
legal regimes were the greatest threat to the online community, who
believed that the computer scientist would remain in control of the
network (and thus in control of enforcement) found themselves asking
Congress to protect the Internet from private actors and market forces.
113. See Thierer, supra note 110, at 283-85 (stating that "there are signs that the days of full-
blown structural access may be numbered").
114. See Yoo, supra note 111, at 3-5 (stating that "network neutrality hearkens back to the
regime of mandatory interconnection and interface standardization used so successfully by the courts
and the FCC to foster competition in telephone equipment").
115. Thierer, supra note 110, at 276. Thierer describes the distinction between dumb pipes and
intelligent networks as follows: "A purely dumb pipe, for example, would be a broadband network
without any proprietary code, applications, or software included. An intelligent network, by
contrast, would integrate some or all of those things into the system." Id.
116. Lessig & McChesney, supra note 112.
117. Id.
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B. What Is Left of Exceptionalism?
What then is left of Internet exceptionalism? In his revolutionary "A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace," John Perry Barlow
described cyberspace as consisting not of computers, wires, or code, but
of "transactions, relationships, and thought itself.""18 It was this vision,
this perception of an evolving "social space," '1 9 that guided Barlow's
ideal of the culture he sought to preserve-a distinct vision of potential
worthy of protection. Barlow's expression of the basic cyberlibertarian
norms that define that environment reflect his focus on behavior,
relationship, and expression:
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or
prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station
of birth.
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or
her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into
silence or conformity.
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and
context do not apply to us.Iem
To many early inhabitants of cyberspace, communal control and
regulation of network architecture appeared a given, if for no other
reason than that perfect external control seemed almost impossible. 121
Freedom of choice in individual expression, human behavior, and
relationships were the heart of the online cultural and social ideal that
stirred Barlow and other cyberlibertarians.
As it evolved, the governance debate fractured this largely unified
vision, distinguishing validity from preference, law and social norms
from architecture and code, technical exceptionalism from cultural
exceptionalism, government power from private commercial power, and
even libertarian from libertarian. Lessig argued persuasively that the
greatest threat to digital libertarianism arose from private actors,
unbounded by fundamental values (including constitutional values) and
118. Barlow, supra note 51, at 6. Indeed, the very heart of Barlow's Declaration of
Independence was a poetic rejection of these physical components. See id. at I (demanding
"Governments of the Industrial world, you weary giants of flesh and steel.., leave us alone").
119. Id.at 2.
120. Id. 7-9.
121. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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with the ability to exercise perfect control over choice. 122  Lessig's
analysis, generally speaking, was focused on the treatment of data as
data, based primarily on the identity of its "owner" and the commercial
interests represented. 123 Choice in action was to be controlled by the
regulation of owned data, 2 4 discriminatory treatment of data to the
benefit of certain owners, restriction of network access, and similar
means. 125 These technical controls would then be bolstered by traditional
sovereign law validating those measures.
What seems somewhat obscured in Lessig's architecture-and-code
approach (which clearly remains the central concern of the governance
debate) is Barlow's original vision of relational libertarianism, with its
focus on expression of individual choice and the development of new
communal social norms within a system of self-governance. This is the
part of Internet exceptionalism that was, in a sense, overwhelmed by the
debate over architecture and code. Yet there are some choices, primarily
relational, that remain largely unaffected by that debate. In this sphere,
the question is not access to choice, the ability to choose, or the available
universe of choices, but rather what norms apply to the choices being
made outside those controls.
Post argued that fundamental normative values could "best be
protected by allowing the widest possible scope for uncoordinated and
uncoerced individual choice among different values and among different
embodiments of those values.' 26  He believed that the imposition of
sovereign legal regimes in cyberspace, rather than promoting
fundamental values as Lessig argued, would instead deny the digital
libertarian culture the opportunity to develop apart from the offline
world, with its own set of fundamental values. 127 He argues it is better to
serve the private interest (even if powerful and commercially motivated)
than the interest of terrestrial sovereigns. Indeed, exceptionalism was
seen as requiring self-governance, to the exclusion of external legal
norms imposed by sovereign powers, as a precondition to the emergence
of a new system of norms.
122. See LESSIG, supra note 52, at 217.
123. See generally id.
124. Such regulation includes expanded intellectual property rights, the contractual licensing of
such rights rather than physical transfer of ownership, and digital rights management.
125. See generally LESSIG, supra note 52.
126. Post, supra note 52, at 1440.
127. Id.
2008]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
C. Section 230 as a Form of CyberLibertarian Exceptionalism
Most would say that Barlow and Post lost the battle: that the
mythical "civilization of the Mind," "immune to ... sovereignty," in
which "governance will emerge" anew to create and enforce new social
norms 128 was just that-mythical. However, this particular strain of
Internet exceptionalism, envisioned as self-governance and emerging
social norms applicable to relationships between individuals (as opposed
to data as data), has been preserved in a modified, less demanding form.
Ironically, it is because of sovereign law, not in spite of it, that this
occurred. The dramatic expansion of § 230 immunity has effectuated
many of the ideals promoted by Post, Barlow, and others, albeit on a
limited scale. This expansion has created an environment in which many
of the norms and regulatory mechanisms present in the offline world are
effectively inapplicable. This is so not because the very nature of
cyberspace makes such application impossible, or because sovereign law
is necessarily ineffective or invalid, but rather because sovereign law has
affirmatively created that condition.
The torts for which § 230 provides immunity are, together with
contract law, the primary means by which society defines civil wrongs
actionable at law. These norms of conduct regulate relationships among
individuals: articulating wrongs against the physical and psychic well-
being of the person (e.g., assault, battery, emotional distress), wrongs
against property (e.g., trespass to land, trespass to chattels, conversion),
wrongs against economic interests (e.g., fraud, tortious interference), and
wrongs against reputation and privacy (e.g., defamation,
misappropriation of publicity, invasion of privacy). 29 As described in
Part I of this Article, § 230 has been interpreted and applied to provide
expansive immunity from tort liability for actions taken on or in
conjunction with computer networks, including the Internet. Statutory
language defining who may claim the protections of § 230 immunity,
including "providers" of "interactive computer services" and the "users"
of such services, has been broadly extended. 130 In contrast, the primary
limitation on the range of claimants to § 230 immunity, which is
statutorily unavailable to the allegedly tortious "information content
provider," has been strictly construed.'13  Moreover, the immunity
128. Barlow, supra note 51, at 10, 15-16.
129. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 2 (3d ed. West Publishing Co. 1964) (defining
torts as civil wrongs).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 31-42.
131. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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provided to this expansive cross-section of online participants now
reaches well beyond defamation to include a wide range of other tortious
conduct and claims.132 As such, many of the norms of conduct regulating
relationships among individuals in the offline world-those civil wrongs
actionable at (tort) law-simply do not apply to many in the online
world.
A few examples might provide the best illustration of this gap
between offline societal norms as expressed in tort law and § 230
immunity from tort liability for online participants, even where the
alleged civil wrong seems familiar to the offline community.
In Florida, a mother filed suit against AOL133 alleging that one of its
adult members had used AOL chat rooms to market child pornography,
including photographs and videotapes depicting her eleven-year-old son
engaged in sexual acts with other minors and the adult.1 34 Although
"complaints had been communicated to AOL as to [the member's]
transmitting obscene and unlawful photographs or images and... AOL
reserved the right to terminate without notice the service of any member
who did not abide by its 'Terms of Service and Rules of the Road,' AOL
neither warned [the member] to stop nor suspended his service.
' 35
Assuming for the purposes of AOL's motion to dismiss that the plaintiff
had stated a cause of action for liability in negligence, the Florida
Supreme Court nevertheless found AOL to be immune under § 230.136
In California, an individual filed suit against eBay alleging that eBay
had actively "misrepresented the safety of purchasing items, 137 from
third-party dealers, despite having general and constructive notice that
these dealers were selling fraudulently autographed sports
memorabilia. 38  Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on the pleadings
despite allegations that eBay had participated extensively in the disputed
auction process, tightly regulated the transactions, retained the right to
terminate the account of any seller engaged in fraudulent activity, and
collected both placement and success fees when items were sold.
1 39
Moreover, eBay encouraged buyers to rely on its "star" safety system,
which rates third-party sellers based on customer feedback.140 Although
132. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
133. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).
134. Id. at 1011-12.
135. Id. at 1012.
136. Id. at 1018.
137. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 (Ct. App. 2002).
138. Id. at 708.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 717.
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eBay knew that these ratings were extensively manipulated by dealers-
including those selling fake sports memorabilia-eBay continued to
advertise that "[a] positive eBay rating is worth its weight in gold" to
potential customers. 14' Under § 230, eBay was found to be entirely
immune. 142
In both of these cases, the defendant was alleged to be aware of the
illegal acts of their users, and to be either actively facilitating those
illegal acts or refusing to stop them, even where the defendants had the
knowledge, technical ability, and contractual right to do so. In the
offline world, such active and knowing facilitation would likely violate
social norms established in tort law. In the online world, however, the
defendants were immune from liability. 143  Established norms, as
expressed through the mechanisms of tort law, were neutralized by § 230
and the courts' interpretations of that provision.
In the near absence of these external legal norms, at least within the
range of choices being made outside the data-as-data architectural
controls, the online community is free to create its own norms, its own
rules of conduct, or none at all. The inhabitants may not have a blank
slate-criminal law, intellectual property law, and contract law still
apply' 44 -but much of what Barlow embraced as central tenets (mind,
identity, expression) remain undefined. It is a modified version of
cyberlibertarian exceptionalism, less demanding of the sovereign and
existing offline social norms, and therefore less satisfying. But it is
nonetheless a glimpse of that society, maintained by the sovereign legal
regime rather than against it. It now applies to nearly every tort that can
be committed in cyberspace. It is nibbling at the edges of intellectual
property rights. It protects against the civil liability components of
141. Id.
142. Id. at 719.
143. See, e.g., Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox: Libel, Slander and the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 279, 279 (1999). Here, Pincus observes:
I work under contract for the Washington Post Newspaper. If the Post published an
article of mine defaming a private individual, the paper would be liable. However, if
washingtonpost.com, the Post's on-line Internet site, were to carry the same article, it
would not be similarly liable. Why? Because Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 bars liability for interactive computer service providers exercising a
publisher's traditional editorial functions, such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone, or alter content. The Act immunizes Internet providers from precisely the sort
of liability on which plaintiffs rely to hold other publishers accountable.
Id.
144. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(4) (2000). But see Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102,
1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that § 230 immunity extends to state-law intellectual property
claims, including unfair competition, false advertising, and right of publicity).
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criminal acts. It extends to all but the first speaker, who may well get
lost in the network to escape liability even without immunity.
IV. A CASE FOR PRESERVING § 230 IMMUNITY
As interpreted by the courts, the immunity provisions of § 230 have
been heavily criticized. Many commentators have argued that by failing
to impose indirect liability on intermediaries, significant harms will go
undeterred or unremedied, and that § 230 should be reformed to serve the
interests of efficiency and cost allocation. This part of the Article
addresses these criticisms directly, concluding that substantially
reforming the statute is both unnecessary and unwise because the cost of
such liability is unreasonable in relation to the harm deterred or
remedied. Indeed, given § 230's role in facilitating the development of
Web 2.0 communities, in which a form of modified exceptionalism
encourages "collaborative production" and the emergence of "non-
commodified digital space that facilitates communication," reforming the
statute to narrow the grant of immunity would significantly damage the
online environment. 1
45
A. Evaluating Calls for Reform
Early critics of § 230 tended to focus on the issues of congressional
intent and broad interpretation by the courts. 146  More recent
145. See Mark Cooper, From WiFi to Wikis and Open Source: The Political Economy of
Collaborative Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 125,
126-27 (2006) (calling collaborative product the next "main event").
146. In its initial phases, § 230 commentators tended to focus on the issue of congressional intent
and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., discussed in Part I of this article.
Most commentators strongly criticized the Zeran court's conclusion that the statute immunizes
intermediaries not only from publisher liability for objectionable third-party content, but from
distributor liability as well. This could not, most commentators agreed, be what Congress intended.
As the principles outlined in Zeran nevertheless became widely accepted, criticism turned to new
cases interpreting the statute to extend this expansive immunity both to a growing class of
intermediaries and to a broadening range of wrongful acts. Few of these assessments moved
significantly beyond the apparent inability of Congress to craft a statute effectuating its intent or the
courts' inability (or unwillingness) to interpret the statute in a way that reasonably limited its impact.
See, e.g., Emily K. Fritts, Note, Internet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the
Courts Erroneously Interpreted Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of Internet Service
Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765, 767, 784 (2004/2005) (analyzing "how the courts have applied
defamation law with regard to Internet Service Providers"); Miree Kim, Narrowing the Definition of
an Interactive Service Provider Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 2003 B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 033102 (2003), available at http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/
avp/law/st org/iptf/articles/content/2003033102.html (exploring why Congress's definition of
internet service providers under § 230 is inadequate); Robert T. Langdon, Note, The
Communications Decency Act § 230: Make Sense? Or Nonsense?-A Private Person's Inability to
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commentators have moved beyond these issues to engage the larger
implications of providing such sweeping immunity to online
intermediaries, suggesting amendments to § -230 intended to effectuate
policies of efficiency and cost allocation. 147 This critique begins with the
premise that in the online environment individual bad actors are
"typically far beyond the reach of conventional law." 148  This creates a
situation in which significant individual harms cannot be legally deterred
or remedied, 149 and the fear that "[w]ithout effective enforcement of
consumer rights and remedies, the Internet will not fulfill its promise as a
secure marketplace for procuring goods or services."'1 50 Given these
negative conditions, where a third-party maintains a level of control that
places it "in a good position to detect or deter another's bad act," the
imposition of indirect liability is desirable.1 5i The failure to do so may
create inefficiencies by failing to detect and deter harmful behavior
where the cost of doing so is reasonable. Commentators have argued
that, in the online environment, intermediaries are in the best position to
deter negative behavior, to track down primary wrongdoers, and to
mitigate damages. 152  This is particularly. true in regard to information-
based torts, the damages of which might be mitigated in many
circumstances simply by taking down, prohibiting, or blocking the
objectionable content.1 53  As the "least cost avoider, '' 154 "ISPs might
Recover if Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 829, 849-55 (1999) ("[T]he
Communications Decency Act does a great disservice to private individuals harmed by defamation
on the Internet by foreclosing adequate legal remedies."); Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing
Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts
Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 678-91 (2002) (discussing alternatives to existing interpretations of
CDA immunity by courts and Congress).
147. See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 226 (2006) (arguing "the goal [is] to encourage service providers to adopt
the precautions that they can provide most efficiently while leaving any remaining precautions to
other market actors"). But see Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and Economics of ISP Liability
for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 264 (2002) ("[N]egligence and strict liability regimes
fail to produce an efficient level of monitoring... [and] undermine the positive attributes of the
Internet by producing a reductive effect on online speech and diminishing network effects [whereas,]
[s]tanding in stark contrast to these results, the effect of Section 230 [immunity] ... has been to
create a relatively efficient regime that simultaneously preserves positive and prevents negative
externalities.").
148. Lichtman & Posner, supra note 147, at 233.
149. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335,
341 (2005).
150. Id. at 383.
151. Lichtman & Posner, supra note 147, at 230.
152. E.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 149, at 385-86.
153. Id. at 339.
154. Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise ofInternet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 239, 249 (2005). Intermediaries are the least cost avoiders in the online context
because of"(l) an increase in the likelihood that it will be easy to identify specific intermediaries for
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rightly be held liable for permitting malicious behaviors that they could
have detected or deterred at reasonable cost.'
155
At the heart of this attack on § 230 immunity is the idea that, in the
absence of indirect intermediary liability, significant harms will go
undeterred or unremedied. These fears are either misplaced or
overstated. As an initial matter, it is not clear that a significant number
of bad actors are beyond the reach of the law. Advances in technology
are making it increasingly possible to locate and identify bad actors
online, such that online anonymity is difficult to maintain.156 Likewise,
where the bad actor is identified but is found outside the jurisdiction,
sovereign governments have developed methods for resolving disputes to
permit the direct extraterritorial application of domestic law, such as
rules of jurisdiction, conflicts of laws, and recognition of judgments.1 57
Indeed, anti-exceptionalists have strenuously argued that the application
of sovereign authority to online activity originating outside the
jurisdiction is legitimate and valid in large part because of these rules. 158
Moreover, although the immunity provided by § 230 arguably
mitigates the legal incentives for online intermediaries to deter and
remedy certain negative behavior, it does not eliminate those legal
incentives. Section 230 expressly states that it has no effect on criminal
law, intellectual property law, or communications privacy law. 159 These
external norms remain applicable to and enforceable against both
content-providers and intermediaries in the online environment. Perhaps
even more significantly, although § 230 removes legal incentives to
enforce the norms expressed in tort law, law is certainly not the only
incentive for an intermediary to act. Communal, commercial and other
incentives also play a role.160  Indeed, § 230 immunity allows
large classes of transactions, (2) a reduction in information costs, which makes it easier for the
intermediaries to monitor the conduct of end users, and (3) increased anonymity, which makes
remedies against end users generally less effective." Id. at 240.
155. Lichtman & Posner, supra note 147, at 256.
156. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Snared in the Web of a Wikipedia Liar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2005, at 4-1 (stating that "Lawrence Lessig, a law professor at Stanford and an expert in the laws of
cyberspace, said that contrary to popular belief, true defamation was easily pursued through the
courts because almost everything on the Internet was traceable and subpoenas were not that hard to
obtain. (For real anonymity, [Lessig] advised, use a pay phone.)").
157. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 50, at 1232-37 (describing tools to
resolve true conflicts between sovereigns).
158. Id. at 1239-42.
159. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2000).
160. See Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online Third-
Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 647, 664 (2000)
(arguing that "the concerns expressed by critics that Zeran would discourage [intermediaries] from
monitoring their networks for offensive material have clearly proven to be incorrect"). See also
infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
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intermediaries the freedom to intervene in a multitude of ways. Thus,
individual harms and marketplace security can be addressed through
alternate legal regimes and internal incentives.
Furthermore, proponents of indirect intermediary liability concede
that even where harms do exist, intermediaries may only rightly be held
liable for failing to detect and deter harmful behavior where the cost of
doing so is reasonable. 161  It is unclear, however, that the costs of
intermedial regulation are reasonable. In terms of remedies and reforms,
critics generally suggest some form of the detect-deter-mitigate model,
imposing a duty upon the intermediary with the potential for liability in
cases of breach. 62  The two most common models are "traditional
damages regimes, [and] takedown damages schemes in which the
offensive content must be removed after proper notice. 163 Proponents of
traditional liability schemes generally find theoretical fault with the
exceptionalist view of the Internet, and analytical fault with broad
judicial interpretations of the statute that collapse "distributor with
knowledge" liability into immunity from publisher liability. 164
Proponents of a "synchronized 'notice, takedown, and put-back'
regime"'165 likewise work from a "distributor with knowledge" model that
imposes a limited duty of care on intermediaries, 66 but generally
acknowledge some degree of exceptionalism that requires a distinct
scheme. Most suggest some variation utilizing elements of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") 167 and the European Union's E-
Commerce Directive, triggered by actual notice of the objectionable
content or a standard of reasonable care, and requiring "prompt remedial
action to avoid further losses."'1
68
161. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 149, at 343-44, 389.
163. Mann & Belzley, supra note 154, at 251. Some commentators have suggested "'hot list'
schemes in which the intermediary must avoid facilitation of transactions with certain parties." Id. at
250-51, 271-72. This approach, borrowed from the financial industry, shifts much of the burden
from the intermediary to a third-party actor, usually the government, who acts to identify
wrongdoers. Id at 271. The intermediary would then play the purely ministerial role of blocking
network transactions. Id.
164. See Melissa A. Troiano, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should
Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1447, 1475-76 (2006). See also Susan Freiwald,
Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for
Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 654 (2001) (arguing that under a comparative institutional
analysis, the "legal rule of total immunity for intermediaries rather than distributor liability
represents a failure of public policy and the poor resolution of a legal conflict").
165. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 149, at 389.
166. Id. at 388.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l) (2000).
168. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 149, at 343-44, 389. It should be acknowledged that the
fairly unique position of United States law with regards to intermediary immunity from liability for
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The costs of these indirect intermediary liability schemes could be
great. Under traditional liability rules, intermediaries may be forced to
adopt a least-common-denominator approach, resulting in overly broad
restrictions on expression and behavior. A modified distributor-with-
knowledge approach, usually in the form of a takedown scheme similar
to that employed by the DMCA, may produce the same type of chilling
effect. 169  Indeed, a recent study found that the DMCA takedown
provisions were "commonly being used... to create leverage in a
competitive marketplace, to protect rights not given by copyright (or
perhaps any other law), and to stifle criticism, commentary and fair
use."' 7  This is potentially exacerbated by the use of a "should have
known" standard that can trigger the need to patrol for harmful content,
raising costs and leading to even greater overbreadth in application.
171
Moreover, indirect liability reduces incentives to develop self-help
third-party content creates additional pressure for reform. See generally THE GLOBAL INTERNET
POLICY INITIATIVE, APPLICATION OF DEFAMATION LAWS TO THE INTERNET (2001), available at
http://www.internetpolicy.net/practices/libellaw.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2007) (discussing the
applicable law of the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, etc.). Much of the Internet
remains borderless and decentralized, with near universal access to data. See H. Brian Holland,
Inherently Dangerous: The Potential for an Internet-Specific Standard Restricting Speech that
Performs a Teaching Function, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 402, 403 n.242 (2005) (discussing
"disquieting history of confronting perceived threats to our political system with laws that muffle
voices of dissent"). In many cases, the effects of activities in cyberspace are felt simultaneously
throughout the network. See Johnson & Post, supra note 50, at 1375 (describing the effects of online
activity as being felt simultaneously throughout the network, "everywhere or nowhere in
particular"). As a result, with each online act, content providers and their intermediaries are
potentially exposed to multiple legal regimes, and thus overlapping and inconsistent regulation of the
same activity. See id. at 1373-74 (discussing some states' assertion of "the right to regulate all
online trade"). At the same time, multiple jurisdictions are exposed to the acts of individuals outside
their borders with each act facilitated by intermediaries that have the potential ability to block those
acts from entering the larger network. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (quoting lower
court which stated, "[o]nce a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content
from entering any community"); Joseph Kahn, China Has World's Tightest Internet Censorship,
Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at Al3 (describing China's success in using routers as
checkpoints to filter content in real time). In this context, distinctions between legal regimes are
emphasized, particularly where complex and sensitive social norms and values are implicated.
169. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 683 (2006) (arguing that the DMCA's takedown procedures are overbroad);
Mike Scott, Note, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 99, 157 (2005/2006) (arguing that, as currently constructed, the DMCA was "tilt[ed]
sharply in favor of the rights of copyright holders"). The Electronic Frontier Foundation has
chronicled its legal campaign against a "DMCA abuser" who systematically used baseless takedown
notices in an effort to censor speech. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Diehl v. Crook, http://
www.eff.org/legal/cases/diehl_v_crook/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
170. Urban & Quilter, supra note 169, at 687.
171. See Todd E. Reese, Wading Through the Muddy Waters: The Courts' Misapplication of
Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 287, 300 (2004)
(criticizing the common application of a "should have known" standard in the context of the
DMCA).
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technology, such as location or identity tracking software and user-end
filters, the development of which was one of § 230's primary policy
goals.172  Thus, if the scale of undeterred or unremedied harms is
minimal, and the negative impact of a detect-deter-mitigate model is
significant, then the cost associated with the imposition of indirect
intermediary liability is not reasonable.
B. Resisting the Urge Toward Homogeny'
73
The case for preserving § 230 immunity begins by recasting
intermediary immunity in terms of exceptionalism, self-governance and
norms, because it is precisely the gap between the offline social norms
expressed in tort law and the broad immunity provided to online
participants that has led to the rather strong criticism of § 230. As a
conceptual matter, communal enforcement presents the greatest
challenge to effectuating some modified version of the exceptionalist
ideal. When external legal norms are excluded, internal enforcement
mechanisms facilitate the emergence of new communal norms to take
their place. Much of the criticism of § 230 stems from the lack of legal
enforcement that accompanies immunity, and the resulting inability to
form new social norms to replace those of the sovereign. It is important
to recognize, however, that Web 2.0174 communities, such as wikis 175 and
social networks, 176 represent a real and significant manifestation of the
172. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)-(4) (2000) (describing the policies behind the enactment of §
230).
173. This reference to "homogeny" is drawn from a talk given by Professor Eric Goldman of
Santa Clara University School of Law. Professor Goldman spoke about derivative liability at a
conference at Michigan State University Law School. See Talk on 47 USC 230 at Michigan State,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/04/talkon_47 usc.htm (discussing his upcoming
presentation). He pointed to the "emergence of heterogeneous communities" as a policy benefit of §
230 immunity. See Michigan State Talk (April 2005), available at http://blog.ericgoldman.
org/archives/msu230talkapr2005.pdf (Professor Goldman's notes for the talk).
174. "Web 2.0 is [a]n umbrella term for the second wave of the World Wide Web ....
Sometimes called the 'New Internet,' Web 2.0 is not a specific technology; rather, it refers to two
major paradigm shifts. The one most often touted is 'user-generated content... ' The second is
'thin client computing."' TECHENCYCLOPEDIA: Web 2.0, http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/
defineterm.jhtml;jsessionid=5WCZR4K4VZ5AQQSNDLRCKHOCJUNN2JVN?termv~web+2.0 (last
visited Jan. 9, 2008).
175. "A wiki is [a] Web site that can be quickly edited by its visitors with simple formatting
rules." TECHENCYCLOPEDIA: Wiki, http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?Term
=wiki (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
176. "A Web site that provides a virtual community for people interested in a particular subject
or just to 'hang out' together. Members communicate by voice, chat, instant message,
videoconference and blogs, and the service typically provides a way for members to contact friends
of other members . ... [A] 'virtual community."' TECHENCYCLOPEDIA: Social Networking Site,
http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia/defineterm.jhtml?term=socialnetworkingsite (last visited
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exceptionalist vision, because they both facilitate a market in norms and
values, and provide the internal enforcement mechanisms necessary for
internal norms to emerge. Section 230 plays a vital role in the
development of these communities by substantially and continually
mitigating the primacy of external legal norms within the confines of the
community. This permits choice, empowers the intermediary to create a
market in social norms, and allows alternate forms and gradations of
enforcement. The architecture of the community gives these choices
form and substance, backed by an enforcement model, such that
communal norms have the opportunity to develop. In this sense, § 230
and the Web 2.0 model effectuate the emergence of a modified form of
exceptionalism. The reforms proposed by most commentators would
have a negative impact on these communities, with little benefit beyond
those communal norms that are likely to emerge, and should be rejected.
1. Exceptionalism, Self-Governance and Social Norms
Exceptionalism does not argue for the absence of social norms.
Instead, exceptionalism embraces the idea of cyberspace as an
environment in which the authority of external legal regimes is minimal,
and where an open market in norms and values works in concert with
self-governance to permit the online community to establish its own
substantive social norms. Section 230 helps to effectuate a modified
form of exceptionalism by moderating the imposition of external legal
norms so as to permit a limited range of choices-bounded, at least, by
criminal law, intellectual property law and contract law-in which the
online community is free to create its own norms and rules of conduct.
However, the development of social norms within this environment
requires not only the ability to exercise broad individual choice among
different values and embodiments of those values, but also some
mechanism of communal enforcement through which to effectuate some
form of self-governance.
Early proponents of exceptionalism were able to focus on relational
libertarian ideals, viewing the Internet as a unique social space in which
norms governing thought, expression, identity, and relationship should
be permitted to evolve. This focus developed precisely because the
mechanisms of enforcement required for self-governance and the
evolving definition of emergent social norms were taken for granted.
The architecture of enforcement was primarily controlled by a
Apr. 3, 2007).
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community involved in the process as adherents to the exceptionalist
ideal, who could be trusted both to ensure broad individual choice and to
utilize the means of enforcement as a tool of self-govemance as norms
emerged.
177
As a means of effectuating exceptionalism, the primary weakness of
§ 230 is the lack of an enforcement component. Although the modified
exceptionalism enabled by § 230 permits a range of choices, it does
nothing to provide enforcement mechanisms to solidify emerging
communal norms. Where immunity exists, legal enforcement
mechanisms are never triggered. Likewise, the architecture of
enforcement relied upon by early exceptionalists is no longer communal
or likely committed to the vision of a distinct cyberlibertarian space, but
is instead concentrated in private commercial entities. As a consequence,
§ 230 immunity creates a gap. Certain external legal norms are
excluded, but internal communal norms are often unable to coalesce to
take their place. It is this gap, resulting from the lack of architectural
enforcement controls, which fuels criticism of the immunity provision.
In application, however, an enforcement model has emerged that
mediates the tension between the broad availability of individual value
choices and the ability to effectively self-govern so as to permit the
development of communal norms.
2. Communities of Modified Exceptionalism
Web 2.0 communities are, generally speaking, "a perceived second
generation of web-based ... services-such as social-networking sites,
wikis and folksonomies-which aim to facilitate collaboration and
sharing among users."'178  The community is structured as a limited
commons and is built on an "architecture of participation"' 79 that
operates as a platform for user-created content and collaboration. 180 At
its heart are principles of open communication, decentralized authority,
177. See supra note 59.
178. WIKIPEDIA: Web 2.0, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki[Web_2 (last visited Apr. 3, 2007)
(referencing and defining Web 2.0 as a phrase coined by O'Reilly Media in 2004). See also Tim
O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of
Software, http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2007) (identifying, inter alia, Wikipedia and folksonomies such as del.icio.us and
Flickr as examples of Web 2.0).
179. O'Reilly, supra note 178.
180. Id. See also Kevin Kelly, We Are the Web, WIRED, Aug. 2005, available at http://www.
wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/tech.html (describing the promotion of consumers into producers
and the future of the Internet as a "network of social creation" and a "community of collaborative
interaction").
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the freedom to share and re-use, and an idea of the Internet as a social
forum or market for exchanging opinions and ideas in search of norms1 81
to create a "culture based on sharing."'1 82 Section 230 plays a vital role in
the development and maintenance of these architectures by providing
intermediaries with limited immunity from liability for the tortious
content provided by users. 183 Indeed, in this sense, § 230 seems to favor
the development of Web 2.0 services and the provision of user-based
content over the traditional model of providing first-party institutional
content.
The parallels between Web 2.0 and Barlow's vision of a communal
social space are evident, albeit in modified form. Barlow embraced the
potential of an environment premised upon freedom of choice in
individual expression, human behavior and relationships. 8 4 To achieve
that potential, he and others believed that regulation by existing
sovereign powers must be rejected in favor of self-governance, so that
new communal social norms might have the opportunity to emerge.
1 85
At the heart of this ideal was an affirmation that values participation in
the market of expression, ideas and action without the constraint of
preconceived value judgments. Web 2.0 promises a somewhat limited
version of this environment--existing within sovereign authority,
narrowed by certain enduring norms, and confined to segmented
communities administered by private entities-by facilitating the market
by which norms are tested.
Two of the most common models of these Web 2.0 services, wikis
and social networks, are indicative of how § 230 can effectuate the
modified form of cyberlibertarian exceptionalism described above.
Partly as a result of the immunity from liability provided by § 230, these
services facilitate the market in social norms by creating enclaves in
which users may exercise broad (although not unbounded) individual
choice among values. At the same time, the intermediary retains control
over the architecture and thus the means of enforcement. As the market
defines social good through the evolution of communal norms, that
architecture may be employed as a mechanism of governance. 186 In the
absence of legal incentives, the enforcement of communal norms is
181. See generally O'Reilly, supra note 178; Kelly, supra note 180.
182. Kelly, supra note 180.
183. See supra Part II (describing the expansive immunity provided by § 230 as interpreted and
applied by the courts).
184. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 55-59, 62-66 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text (describing the architectural
enforcement mechanisms utilized by Wikipedia and the resulting development of social norms).
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driven by internal incentives, such as the need for financial support from
community donations, a communal desire for information integrity, or
the need to build an audience for advertising. 187 In some communities,
participants may be incentivized by credibility and stature in the form of
temporal seniority, post count, rank within the community's governing
body, etc.' 
88
The online encyclopedia Wikipedia189 is a specific example of a Web
2.0 community. Culturally, Wikipedia is a "massive experiment in
collective action."190 Each entry in the Wikipedia database is created and
edited by volunteers' 91 who are guided by three primary principles: the
Neutral Point of View policy, the No Original Research policy, and the
Verifiability policy. 192 Registered users can originate new articles, and
any user, whether registered or anonymous, can edit an existing article.' 93
In the period between Wikipedia's inception in January of 2001 and
187. Wikipedia is a project of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit
organization that relies significantly on donations from its users. Wikimedia: Fundraising, http://
wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Fundraising (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). Likewise, the Wikipedia
community has developed enforcement mechanisms to further its internal norms of objective writing
and accuracy. See, e.g., infra note 205 (describing the Colbert "elephant" incident). In the
commercial arena, intermediaries are motivated by economics to act responsibly and police their
services. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 160, at 664-65. See also Cooper, supra note 145, at
126-27 (noting that commercial platforms, such as social networking sites, are driven more clearly
by economic incentives).
188. The online service Experts Exchange provides an excellent example of this type of
incentive. Experts Exchange: Home, http://www.experts-exchange.com/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2007). This website describes itself as one that uses collaborative knowledge to solve technology
problems. Experts Exchange: About Us, http://www.experts-exchange.com/aboutUs.jsp (last visited
Apr. 3, 2007). Contributors are incentivized by a community point system that rewards the best
answers to technology questions, and by competing for awards such as "Expert of the Year."
Experts Exchange: The Third Annual Expert Awards 2007, http://www.experts-exchange.
com/expertAwards2007.jsp (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
189. WIKIPEDIA, http://wikipedia.org/. Wikipedia describes itself as a "multilingual, web-based,
free content encyclopedia project ... written collaboratively by volunteers ...." WIKIPEDIA:
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
190. FERNANDA B. VItGAS ET AL., VISUAL COMM'N LAB, IBM RESEARCH, TALK BEFORE You
TYPE: COORDINATION IN WIKIPEDIA § 2, http://www.research.ibm.com/visual/papers/wikipedia_
coordination final.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
191. Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 164 (2006).
192. Id. at 169-70. See also WIKIPEDIA: Policies and Guidelines, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Policies-and guidelines (last visited Jan. 9, 2008).
193. Myers, supra note 191, at 169. Prior to December 5, 2005, any user, registered or not, was
able to create new articles. Id. at 171. However, after a particularly embarrassing incident in which
an unregistered user wrote that John Seigenthaler, Sr. "was thought to have been directly involved in
the Kennedy assassinations of both John, and his brother, Bobby," Wikipedia altered its architecture
and policies to permit only registered users to create new articles. Id. at 170-71.
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October of 2006, this experiment in voluntary collaborative action
produced more than five million articles.
194
These activities are overseen by two levels of administrators,
"sysops" and "voting sysops. ' 195 "Sysops" have the power to edit pages,
delete or undelete articles and article histories, protect pages, and block
or unblock user accounts or IP addresses. 196  Voting sysops, or super
administrators (also called "bureaucrats" or "stewards"), have the further
power to create additional sysops with the approval of the community. 97
In February 2006, in response to a series of significant and persistent acts
of vandalism, 198 the co-founder of Wikipedia created an additional layer
of administration that permits a particular super administrator to protect
or modify any article at the direction of the co-founder. 199 These
administrators help facilitate dispute resolution and enforcement. Low-
level disputes are resolved in "talk pages and other coordination spaces"
that provide a "local, low-cost arena for resolving conflicts. '2 ° ° Here,
moderators guide members to resolution with reference to policies and
guidelines developed over the life of the community. 2 1 Thus, principle
values and norms can lead to more specific rules. This approach works
in most cases.20 2 More serious violations, such as malicious editing of an
article (or "vandalism"), are addressed through fast-repair mechanisms
executed by community members.20 3 In 2004, Wikipedia developed a
new enforcement tool, page protection, to address repeated acts of
vandalism. 20 4  Wikipedia administrators are also able to block user
accounts or IP addresses.
20 5
194. Id. at 167 (noting that of this number, approximately 1.4 million articles are in English).
195. Id. at 169.
196. Id.
197. ld.
198. In February 2007, Fuzzy Zoeller filed a lawsuit against a Miami consulting firm after he
was able to track the computer that had added a defamatory paragraph to his biography on
Wikipedia. Michael O'Keeffe, The Score Hears... Fuzzy's Clear About Lawsuit, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 25, 2007, at 63. The entry concerning John Seigenthaler was traced to an employee of a
Nashville delivery company. Seigenthaler said he would not take the prankster to court. Katharine
Q. Seelye, A Little Sleuthing Unmasks Writer of Wikipedia Prank, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at 1-
51.
199. Myers, supra note 191, at 171.
200. VItGAS ETAL., supra note 190, at § 2.
201. Id. at 5, 7.
202. See id. at 8 (noting that "[i]n all 25 pages coded for this paper, the overwhelming majority
of requests for information were answered, strengthening the sense of a strong, supportive
community.").
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id.
205. Myers, supra note 191, at 169. A simple example demonstrates how this system of norms,
oversight and enforcement works. In August of 2006, television satirist Stephen Colbert coined the
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As described, the Wikipedia community reflects a modified form of
the exceptionalist model, allowing initially for individual choice among a
range of values, facilitating a market in social norms, and providing a
means of enforcement to effectuate norms as they develop. Indeed,
recent studies reflect not only that norms have emerged from this market,
but that those norms have solidified and expanded.0 6 Through this
process, the Wikipedia community is moving from an immediate focus
on particular articles "to a more high-level concern for the quality of
content and the health of the community. ' 2
0 7
On the content side, Wikipedia has developed a "self-conscious
social-norms-based dedication to objective writing,, 20 8 as well as norms
of "formality and language standardization., 20 9 Not unexpectedly, open
source projects such as Wikipedia are not immune to abuse.210 In terms
of community health, and to protect against these abuses, Wikipedia has
adopted a code of conduct 211 and principles of etiquette that stress civility
word "wikiality" to describe the idea that "a large number of people could create a truth by
consensus." John Kenney, Elephant, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:JohnKenney/
Elephant_%28wikipedia article%29 (last visited Sept. 24, 2007); Melissa P. McNamara, Stephen
Colbert Sparks Wiki War, CBS NEWS, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/
08/08/blogophile/mainl873436.shtml?source=RSSattr=Opinion:Blogophile_1873436 (last visited
Sept. 24, 2007) (describing Colbert's "wikiality" as "[t]he idea.., that if you convince enough
people that something false is actually true, it ends up becoming accepted as the truth"). To test his
theory, Colbert urged his viewers to "edit Wikipedia's 'elephant' article to indicate that the
population of elephants had tripled in the last six months." Kenney, supra; McNamara, supra.
When viewers responded by following Colbert's instructions, "Wikipedia editors swung into action,
locking new and anonymous users out of the 'elephant' article, as well as the 'Stephen Colbert'
article and several others." Kenney, supra. What followed was an online debate over the actions of
Colbert, his viewers and the Wikipedia editors, through which the process of creating and modifying
norms within that community continued. McNamara, supra (cataloging some of the online
reactions).
206. See VIEGAS ET AL., supra note 190, at abstract (concluding that the fastest growing areas of
Wikipedia are devoted to coordination and organization, with an emphasis on strategic planning,
group coordination, the development of policy and process, and the enforcement of guidelines and
conventions).
207. Id. at § 4.
208. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J.
369, 386 (2002).
209. VIEGAS ETAL., supra note 190, at § 2.
210. According to The Washington Post, "[p]ranksters have altered Wikipedia entries to say that
Tony Blair's middle name is 'Whoop-de Do'; that David Beckham was a Chinese goalkeeper in the
18th century; that the golfer Fuzzy Zoeller had abused alcohol and drugs; and that John Seigenthaler,
a respected journalist, was thought to be involved in the assassinations of both Kennedys (before
absconding to the Soviet Union)." Cass R. Sunstein, A Brave New Wikiworld, WASH. POST, Feb. 24,
2007, at A19. See also Seelye, supra note 156, at 4-1 (quoting Jimmy Wales, the founder of
Wikipedia (in response to the Seigenthaler episode), "[Wikipedia has] constant problems where we
have people who are trying to repeatedly abuse our sites").
211. WIKIPEDIA: Five Pillars, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Five_pillars (describing
the code of conduct as one of five pillars).
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and discourage personal attacks.212 As discussed above, these norms are
enforced through an architecture that is designed to reinforce those
norms with an eye towards the health of the community.21 3 At the most
basic level, "social norms coupled with a simple facility to allow any
participant to edit out blatant opinion written by another in contravention
of the social norms keep the group on track., 214  Over time, more
complex mechanisms for dispute resolution and enforcement have
developed, such that in the past few years the "administrative and
coordinating elements" of Wikipedia have been "growing at a faster pace
than the bulk of articles in the encyclopedia.,
21 5
The relationship between architecture and social norms is
fascinatingly apparent in the recent development of Wikipedia
Scanner,216 "a searchable database that ties millions of anonymous
Wikipedia edits to organizations where those edits apparently originated,
by cross-referencing the edits with data on who owns the associated
block of internet IP addresses., 21 7 An architectural choice by Wikipedia
to track and correlate the IP address of any anonymous user who edits
the encyclopedia2 18 enabled a member of the Wikipedia community to
create a monitoring mechanism for enforcing social norms, particularly
the norm of neutrality, in more controversial areas.219 In terms of more
formal enforcement, some edits that previously may have been
overlooked are now being reexamined in light of the organization from
which they originated. Less formally, but perhaps even more effectively,
organizations which are perceived to have breached the norms of the
community have and will face recriminations. 220  Moreover, the entire
212. WIKIPEDIA: Etiquette, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Etiquette.
213. VItGAS ET AL., supra note 190, at § 6 (making the point that the community benefits when
talk page moderators "turn[] the spotlight from the offending parties onto Wikipedia policies").
214. Benkler, supra note 208, at 387.
215. VIEGAS ET AL., supra note 190, at § 1. See also id. at § 7 (noting the great "proportion of
pages devoted to coordination and administration").
216. Virgil Griffith, Wikiscanner: List anonymous wikipedia edits from interesting
organizations, http://wikiscanner.virgil.gr/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
217. John Borland, See Who's Editing Wikipedia-Diebold, the CIA, a Campaign, WIRED, Aug.
14, 2007, available at http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/08/wiki tracker (last
visited Sept. 24, 2007). According to the article, Wikipedia Scanner was "the brainchild ofCal Tech
computation and neural-systems graduate student Virgil Griffith . I. " Id.
218. Id.
219. Virgil Griffith, the creator of Wikipedia Scanner, has noted: "Overall-especially for non-
controversial topics-Wikipedia seems to work. For controversial topics, Wikipedia can be made
more reliable through techniques like this one." Virgil Griffith, WikiScanner FAQ, http://virgil.gr/
31 .html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
220. Wired magazine, for example, created a submission page to find the "Most Shameful
Wikipedia Spin Jobs." Kevin Poulson, Vote on the Most Shameful Wikipedia Spin Jobs, WIRED,
Aug. 13, 2007, available at http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/vote-on-the-top.html (last
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community is now aware that enforcement of those norms is now more
effective, presumably creating a deterrence effect.
The Wikipedia example illuminates a constant process, as choices
are narrowed by communal norms that develop and are given life
through enforcement mechanisms, such that principle norms generate a
breadth of more particular rules.221  Section 230 immunity plays an
important role in this process, permitting the community to evolve and
structure itself in the most efficient manner. To a limited extent, § 230
immunity permits uncoordinated and uncoerced individual choice among
different values and among different embodiments of those values. It
further allows the intermediary to play an active role in facilitating the
market in social norms and in creating enforcement mechanisms as a tool
of self-governance. Those enforcement mechanisms can then themselves
adapt. This allows not only for the development of distinct community
values, but also for a means of tapping into incentives, adapting to
evolving norms and conditions, and reducing costs associated with
disputes. Within this framework, greater variations in community norms
are possible. As communities grow, niche communities are formed at
low cost. It is not the global vision of early exceptionalism, but rather a
more limited and localized form of modified exceptionalism that
functions as a laboratory for testing social norms and values.
V. CONCLUSION
Critics of § 230 have both overstated the harms arising from
immunity and understated the costs of alternate schemes for imposing
indirect liability on online intermediaries. At the same time, they have
ignored the important role § 230 plays in the development of online
communities. The immunity provided by § 230 helps to create the initial
condition necessary for the development of a modified form of
exceptionalism by mitigating the effect of external legal norms in the
online environment. Web 2.0 communities are then able to facilitate a
market in norms and provide the architectural enforcement mechanisms
that give emerging norms substance. Given § 230's crucial role in this
process, and the growing importance of Web 2.0 communities in which
collaborative production is yielding remarkable results, reforming the
statute to substantially narrow the grant of immunity is both unnecessary
and unwise.
visited Jan. 9, 2008) (click on "submit your own sighting" hyperlink).
221. VIEGAS ET AL., supra note 190, at § I (concluding that "Wikipedia is becoming less
anarchic and more driven by policies and guidelines").
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